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INCOMING DRUG CALLS AND PERFORMATIVE WORDS:
THEY'RE NOT JUST TALKING ABOUT IT, BARON PARKE!
Christopher B. Mueller*
While arresting a suspected drug dealer at the flat he shares with others, police
repeatedly answer a ringing phone and hear a succession of voices asking for the
suspect and trying to buy drugs. Something is up. The incoming calls corrobo-
rate tips and suspicions leading to the arrest, and strengthen inferences of drug
dealing suggested, weakly perhaps, by other circumstantial evidence - para-
phernalia used in the trade and drugs or ingredients in small amounts, all recov-
ered at the scene.
In the trial of the suspect for possession with intent to distribute, proving the
incoming calls raises hearsay concerns because the callers talk about buying
drugs. But they are not just talking - they are actually trying to buy drugs.'
Hence their behavior has an important performative aspect. American and
British courts disagree on the hearsay issue. The former generally (but not
always) admit such proof as nonhearsay, but the 1992 British decision in the case
of Regina v. Kearley,2 where would-be buyers phoned and came in person to the
flat seeking drugs from the suspect, rejects such proof as hearsay (with two dis-
sents). 3
In this Essay, I argue that wise application of hearsay doctrine requires paying
some attention to the performative aspect of human behavior, including spoken
words. Incoming drug calls involve a performative aspect that supports the sug-
gested inference and justifies nonhearsay treatment, so American courts are
headed in the right direction. I then argue that the "implied assertion" concept, a
key element in the British approach that has impact in other areas in both Britain
and America, is misleading and too broad. Finally, I consider some difficulties
presented by incoming drug calls and suggest approaches to them.
* Henry S. Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Craig Callen and Laird
Kirkpatrick for reading and criticizing a draft of this Essay. Their comments led to changes, but I remain
responsible for the views advanced here.
1. In David Mamet's play, Glengarry Glen Ross, Dave Moss drafts George Aaronow into stealing sales
leads, but begins by offering reassurance. "Aaronow: I mean are you actually talking about this, or are we just
.... Moss: We're just speaking about it. (Pause.) As an idea." Aaronow senses the difference between just
talking and planning, but he's no match for Moss, and begins to lose his footing: "Moss: That's right. It's a
crime. It is a crime. It's also very safe. Aaronow: You're actually talking about this?" See DAvID MAMET,
GLENGARRY GLEN Ross 39-40 (Grove Press 1983) (emphasis added).
2. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
3. Id. (opinions by Bridge, Ackner, and Oliver say drug calls should have been excluded as hearsay; dis-
sents by Griffiths and Browne-Wilkinson approve use of the calls). American cases admitting incoming drug
calls include State v. Collins, 886 P2d 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); United States v. Oguns, 921 F2d 442 (2d
Cir. 1990); United States v. Long, 905 E2d 1572 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990); United States v.
Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990). But see People v. Scalzi, 179 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (incom-
ing drug calls should have been excluded).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
I. PERFORMATIVE ASPECT
The right focus of hearsay is assertions rather than acts, and this salient point
suggests that words need not be hearsay when they have important performative
aspects and are offered to prove other acts, events, or conditions in the world.
The beginning point is to consider conduct without words: Proof that someone
puts up an umbrella, when offered to show it is raining, should not ordinarily be
viewed as hearsay.4 Such proof involves a two-step inference - act suggests
belief, which suggests another act or an event or condition in the world (putting
up an umbrella suggests the actor thinks it is raining, which suggests that it is).
There are lots of reasons why this view is right: First, we should let juries sort
out the ambiguities and implications of human acts. We ask them to assess the
quality and nature of behavior and interpret states of mind contextually in resolv-
ing issues of criminal or civil liability, and we should trust them to assess con-
duct by participants, observers, and victims in settings like the drug prosecution
in Kearley. Second, hearsay should not become the "pac-man" of trial rules,
devouring inference after inference as it chews its way through common proof,
exhausting courts and litigators. Most conduct reflects thoughts on the mind of
the actor about what others have done (or events or conditions in the world), and
a great many arguments and inferences would be tangled in technical problems
or forbidden if hearsay doctrine applied. Third, the great hearsay dangers come
with written and spoken utterances offered because of their extraordinary power
to express and communicate, as proof of the very points the speaker put into
words. We ask enough of this doctrine when we apply it to words offered for this
use, even though the two-step inference described above brings risks that parallel
the hearsay risks.'
While it is right to apply hearsay to assertions but not acts, it is a mistake to
suppose human behavior divides neatly into these categories. The reality is that
act and assertion are inseparable aspects of much that people do. Consider the
mugger who says "gimme your wallet" in a situation filled with menace (he
shows a gun; the place is a dark street; he is stronger than his mark; he has the
advantage of surprise; he will risk more). Here words force a taking, by them-
selves or with gestures or movements, and talk about assertions and hearsay risks
seems wide of the mark regardless what the purpose of proving the mugger's
behavior might be.
4. The qualifier "ordinarily" is necessary because any conduct might be designed to express or communi-
cate, in which case it is potentially hearsay after all. Henceforth I will not repeat the qualifier, and I use "con-
duct" to mean nonassertive conduct. I agree with the assumption in the Rules, which is that on balance it seems
wiser to assume that what seems nonassertive is nonassertive, a point verified in common experience (putting
up an umbrella is not a communicative act). See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE
§§ 1.2 and 8.9 (1994) (for apparently nonassertive conduct, party raising hearsay objection bears burden of
showing assertion was intended). For a cogent argument in the other direction, see Ted Finman, Implied
Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REv. 682 (1962).
5. This Essay criticizes the "implied assertion" concept, but the strong point in Baron Parke's position is
that risks of ambiguity, perception, and memory are entailed in conduct offered to prove an act, event, or condi-
tion. And if the actor intends to communicate after all, that raises the candor problem.
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This example is extreme because the mugger's words are strongly coercive in
verbal form (imperative phrasing), in meaning and in circumstance, and they are
part-and-parcel of a crime.6 Yet the example is not unique, and in fact every
statement has at least some performative aspect. At a minimum, speaking or
writing is performative in the senses of showing the speaker lives (breath and
movement), demonstrating literacy or familiarity with terms, and creating or
shaping the relationship between speaker and listener. In trials, usually these
minimal and inevitable performative aspects are unremarkable because they have
little or no bearing on the point to be proved, and only the assertive aspect is use-
ful. "He's the one who robbed the bank" tends to identify the culprit only
because the speaker asserts this point. Performative aspects showing life, litera-
cy, and the attitude of the speaker toward police (shedding light on the relation-
ship) would not help the factfinder figure out who robbed the bank, although
they may count in appraising the speaker and the assertion.
In a significant number of cases, however, the performative aspect of speaking
or writing merits special attention: In what are usefully called mixed act-and-
assertion cases, where expressive behavior in its performative aspect is probative
of the point to be proved, the assertion is not all that counts. Here the fact that
hearsay does not reach acts, coupled with the fact that verbal behavior may have
important performative aspects, suggest that it is wise to allow flexibility in
applying hearsay doctrine. Proper assessment of mixed act and assertion should
take into account what the speaker/actor is trying to accomplish, what motivates
his behavior, and how likely it is that he would do what he is doing if the point to
be proved were not so.' And here as in the case of conduct alone (umbrella
example), the veracity of the actor is a less important factor than it is with asser-
tions offered as such. Incoming drug calls fit the mixed act-and-assertion cate-
gory. As Lord Griffiths said in dissent in Kearley, the callers and visitors "were
acting as customers or potential customers," which supports an inference that
Robert Kearley "was trading as a drug dealer."8 Of course the words are crucial
in appraising the conduct (that was also true of the mugger), and the words did
assert something (interest of callers in buying drugs from defendant), but this
point does not obscure the fact that the callers did try to buy drugs. The right
questions to ask are whether there is enough trying (a strong enough performa-
tive aspect), and whether the point to be proved depends too much on what the
words merely assert (too much hearsay risk).
6. We would call the mugger's words verbal acts if offered to prove a crime. It is a curious conceit that we
as a profession are at home with words that in law are instrumental, yet focus so hard on verbal meaning in
words that are instrumental in life.
7. Proof of drug calls does not typically involve elements of risk or reliance, especially if the caller is
anonymous or the dealing isolated rather than continuous, but in other settings the performative aspect may
entail risk or reliance.
8. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 238 (H.L. Eng. 1992). According to police testimony, more than ten
phone calls came to the flat over several hours, and seven people came in person to the door, all asking for
"Chippie" (defendant), not for his wife or a third occupant of the flat. Id. at 236.
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Consider the degree of trying: If ten people, desperate for drugs, get cash from
muggings and come immediately to defendant's door demanding drugs, the per-
formative aspect would justify the suggested inference, supporting nonhearsay
treatment. If one person phones, asking vaguely about availability and price, the
inference rests mostly on words in their assertive aspect (he implies an interest in
buying, using "imply" in the strong sense examined below), which supports
hearsay treatment. The cases usually fall between these examples, less performa-
tive than the first one, more than the second. Consider the words: If they indi-
cate that defendant deals only by asserting the point, they are hearsay, and the
same would be true if words only expressed a wish or idea (saying is not doing;
what remains is the assertive aspect, which is what hearsay is all about).9 But
more typically, the words of drug callers do not assert or imply in the strong
sense that defendant deals, perhaps because that would be beside the point and
doing so would gain little (why initiate a purchase by accusing the supplier of a
crime?), nor do they express a mere wish or idea. Instead they say in substance
"I want to buy drugs; let's come to terms."1
American courts have leeway in deciding whether to apply hearsay doctrine to
verbal behavior having both performative and assertive aspects, which is good.
In jurisdictions following the Rules, the key point is that the framers wisely
decided to apply hearsay only to assertions, not conduct (so putting up an
umbrella is not hearsay when offered to prove rain)." Since mixed act-and-
assertion cases involve both expression and conduct, courts applying the Rules
can pay appropriate attention to the performative aspect and, if it adequately sup-
ports the point to be proved, treat it as nonhearsay
II. IMPLIED STATEMENTS
The three in the majority in Kearley, who thought the incoming drug calls were
hearsay, relied on the "implied assertion" concept developed by Baron Parke
more than 150 years ago." Recall that Parke said in Wright v. Tatham14 that let-
9. The state-of-mind exception allows use of a statement to prove wish or belief, but not to prove defendant
was a dealer. See FED. R. EVID. 802(3) (cannot prove facts "remembered or believed").
10. Treating an attempt as nonhearsay might be proper even if the words include an assertion. A drug call
might expressly say the other person deals ("I know you deal"), or imply as much in the strong sense ("we both
know why I'm calling; let's just get to it"). Still there is an attempt to buy, and nonhearsay treatment is plausi-
ble if the attempt is probative enough to support the inference of dealing. Words saying or implying that defen-
dant deals could be excluded.
11. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, hearsay doctrine applies only to statements, which include any
"oral or written assertion" or conduct "intended" as an assertion. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.9 (1994) (developing point that conduct is not hearsay under the Rules); United
States v. Zenni, 492 F Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (Rules "abolished" notion that "implied assertions" are
hearsay).
12. See Headley v. Tilghman, 53 E3d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1995), rejecting challenge to state drug conviction
based partly on calls that could be characterized as "mixed acts and assertions" admissible because of their
"performance aspect," but expressing skepticism. Court says assumptions made by callers may be treated as
nonhearsay since the "attendant risks are not as intensively implicated."
13. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 256 (Ackner), 266 (Oliver), 285 (Browne-Wilkinson).
14. Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
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ters to John Marsden were hearsay when offered to prove he was competent to
write a will: The letters "impl[ied] a statement or opinion" on his competence
and were to be treated as "direct and positive" statements on this point."5
Similarly each caller in Kearley "impliedly assert[ed] that he had been supplied
by the defendant with drugs in the past,"1 so the inquiries might be said to con-
tain "in substance, but only by implication," an assertion that defendant dealt
drugs,17 and there is no difference between "an express assertion" and "an infer-
ence to be drawn from precisely the same assertion made by implication.'
Consider more closely this idea of "implied assertions." Because of the con-
ventions of idiomatic speech, every statement (almost every one) implies some-
thing in the strong sense that the speaker means to express or communicate a
point that lies beyond the literal meaning of her words or differs slightly from it.
One who says "I'm sick of all this rain" implies in the strong sense that it is rain-
ing and there has been lots of rain lately, even though these points lie beyond lit-
eral meaning. And the statement implies in the strong sense that the speaker is
down because of the weather (moody, depressed, fed up), although these ideas
differ slightly from the literal meaning of sick. By any reasonable definition of
hearsay (including the one in the Rules), such words are hearsay if offered to
prove these additional points. 9
Cases like Wright and Kearley, however, use "implied statement" in a much
broader sense. In substance, the author of one letter in Wright said "let's sit
down and talk,"2 and each caller in Kearley asked for the defendant and said "I
want to buy drugs; let's come to terms."21 There is no reason to think the one
meant to say "John Marsden, you are competent," or the other meant to say
"Robert Kearley, you deal drugs." Calling these interpretations "implied state-
ments" is a rhetorical shorthand (or sleight-of-hand) that actually means "indicat-
ed conclusion." The effect is to reach everything a statement implies in the
strong sense, plus every conclusion suggested by all statements and all conduct
that depends on the two-step inference (statement or conduct shows what
15. Id. at 518.
16. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 243 (Bridge).
17. Id. at 255 (Ackner) (doubting that drug calls were even relevant, since they only showed state of mind of
callers, which was irrelevant).
18. Id. at 273 (Oliver) (similarly doubting that state of mind of callers was relevant).
19. See Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43, 87-88 (1994) (elaborating
on appropriate interpretive conventions in applying hearsay doctrine; arguing that a communication asserts
propositions its author "would generally intend it to convey"); Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything
About You ": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REv. 783, 799
(1990) (assertions made "metaphorically, sarcastically, or in some other non-literal form" should be hearsay if
offered to prove what speaker meant to assert). And see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE § 8.12 (1994) (matter asserted refers to "points declarant intended to express or communicate," and
should reach "closely connected" points).
20. Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 492 (K.B. 1837).
21. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 236 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
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actor/speaker thought, which shows some act, event, or condition), extending
hearsay doctrine far beyond its reach under the Rules.22
Used in this broad sense, the "implied statement" concept is too broad because
it overextends hearsay doctrine. And it is misleading because it severs the idea of
statement from the expressive or communicative intent of its human source and
creates a fiction that is disconnected from the conventions of human verbal
expression. We can be sure what authors of the letters in Wright had in mind,
and what the callers in Kearley had in mind, but their words do not express their
thoughts, either directly or by implication in the strong sense: In everyday terms,
we speak of assumptions, and are sometimes confident that these are "known
points that went unsaid," and not mere "suppositions lacking any basis."
The judges in Kearley wrote with force and skill, but I think the "implied state-
ment" concept led them into two mistakes. First, they did not adequately appre-
ciate what the callers were doing. In Kearley, Lord Bridge said the fact of
incoming calls was "by itself of no relevance,"23 and Lord Oliver said using the
"combination of words and acts" to prove defendant dealt drugs would invest the
callers' behavior with "false significance" as a means to introduce their state-
ments.2 4 But this view is embarrassed by the decision in Ratten v. Regina 25
reviewing the conviction of a husband for murdering his wife, which approved
evidence that she placed an emergency call just before being shot ("get me the
police please").26 In Kearley, Bridge said her making the call was ,relevant in
showing "her emotional state,' 27 and Oliver said her being "frightened and hys-
terical" was directly in issue.28 There was an act in Ratten (wife at home with
husband places emergency call, setting in motion a police response), but there
were acts in Kearley too (customers tried to buy). It cannot be right that the
wife's call was a relevant act in the murder trial, but not the calls in the drug trial.
Both shed light on what was going on (her call indicated an attack, begun or
imminent; drug calls indicated drug dealing).
Second, the judges in Kearley focused too narrowly on the state of mind of the
callers. One said their state of mind was "of no relevance," apparently because it
could only be understood as implying an inadmissible statement, and that the
wife's statement in Ratten could not be used "as implying an assertion" that she
22. That Parke intended this result is made clear by his example of the captain boarding the ship with his
family. See Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 516 (his behavior hearsay if offered to prove soundness of vessel). Parke
would say putting up an umbrella is an implied statement that it is raining, and "shut the window" is an implied
statement that the person addressed has physical capacity to do what is asked.
23. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 246.
24. Id. at 271-72.
25. 3 All E.R. 801 (H.L. Eng. 1971).
26. See id. (apparently approving wife's call to prove her emotional state under res gestae rule, where
American court would invoke excited utterance exception; husband denied, at trial or in pretrial statement, that
she called police, so her call was relevant to contradict).
27. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 246.
28. Id. at 266.
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was being attacked.a9 But what wife and callers thought in those cases was rele-
vant and had implications far broader than telling us what they thought, because
they were reactions to and reflections of the situations they saw before them.
III. SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
To say incoming drug calls involve an important performative aspect is to say
nonhearsay treatment is plausible and may be the wiser choice. Such evidence
can be persuasive proof, and treating it as hearsay fails to account for much that
is going on. But it would be a mistake to overstate the conclusion: It seems
wiser to treat such calls as hearsay if performative aspects are minimal or
assertive aspects are prominent. If the callers simply made inquiries ("do you
deal?") or leveled accusations ("I know you're a dealer"), arguments for hearsay
treatment would be much stronger. No doubt such proof brings risks: Police
might fabricate their testimony, since drug calls are evanescent events, and police
accounts hard to verify or refute. Or the callers themselves might connive to
leave a false impression. But no evidence is immune from these risks. Hearsay
doctrine properly pays attention to both concerns, but many oral utterances are
admitted despite the first of these risks (reports of excited utterances and admis-
sions could be fabricated). And drug sales are themselves evanescent events,
accomplished in out-of-the-way places by furtive exchanges, and much testimo-
ny and other evidence given by police and informants could be fabricated (the
choice between criminalizing and legalizing drug distribution is not an entirely
happy one).
Nonhearsay treatment does not mean throwing caution to the wind. Exclusion
may be justified even if the incoming calls are not hearsay. Callers or visitors
may lack reliable knowledge, having been misinformed or misled. This risk can
be addressed by argument or cautionary instructions. It could also be addressed
by requiring proof of knowledge as a matter of conditional relevance. Calls
could be excluded unless knowledge were shown or circumstances, such as repe-
tition by numerous callers, suggest the knowledge was there because too much
baseless coincidence is implausible. (The jury could resolve this issue if facts or
circumstances justify a positive finding but leave room for the opposite conclu-
sion too.) And calls could be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as
confusing or misleading.
In cases like Kearley, the sheer number of callers seeking drugs make it less
likely that they acted in the dark or connived, or that the proof was made up, and
more likely that it shows dealing. Here, courts should have room to admit.
29. Id. at 246 (Bridge).
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